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Article 6

Book Reviews

Milton and the Revolutionary Reader by Sharon Achinstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xv + 272. $35.00.
We Have Fish'd and Caught a Frog. In introducing her chapter on Paradise
Lost with a quotation from that pamphlet of 1649, Sharon Achinstein will
perhaps stir at least subliminal echoes of more recent controversies. Despite
the brilliance of Stanley Fish's Surprised By Sin, reader-response criticism has
not seemed to fulfill its original promise. Fish's readers are effectively timeless, gradually yielding to the superior insight of the master-narrator; and,
Achinstein points out, they "perform their acts solo." Milton and the Revolutionary Reader breaks new ground in giving us a Milton who is at once a participant in and an agent of the revolutionary changes of the mid-seventeenth
century, and who aims at both reaching and producing readers who are likewise engaged-rlflfl audience in a very active sense.
Milton himself occupies only part of the book's attention; the book appears
in a welcome new series on "Literature in History" and Achinstein offers a
general analysis of disruptions and innovations in the reading process in the
revolutionary decades of the 1640s and 1650s. These amounted, Achinstein
argues, to an early stage of what Habermas has termed a political public
sphere. She has trawled deeply in the huge ocean of the Thomason Tracts
and come up with much material that will be new even to specialists on the
period. Rather than offering a chronological account, the chapters follow the
spiralling movement of ever more complex hermeneutic responses as traditional practices of reading were disrupted and conservatives tried to contain
those challenges. In his trial in 1649 Lilburne "created a role for his audience
to play" in appealing over the heads of his judges first to the jury and then,
through printed pamphlets, to the nation. This kind of challenge to long-established authority generated the reaction which Achinstein charts in her
second chapter, where John Cleveland and Thomas Hobbes serve as contrasting examples of royalist responses to the Babel of new ideas. The third
chapter examines the widening sphere of debate in pamphlets and political
practice. The Putney Debates of 1647, in which some rank-and-file soldiers
debated the principles of government with their superiors, offer a particularly striking example of debate in practice, where urgent political imperatives meant that the more relaxed humanist model of arguing in utrarnque
partern had to be modified. Yet the debate form might in fact be coercive,
funnelling a spectrum of views into narrowly opposed partisan moulds: political exchange became propaganda. Parliamentarians were, however, more
open to public debate than royalists, who had an inherited dislike of diffusing mysteries of state too far down the social hierarchy, and thus presented
the conflicts in terms of personalities rather than abstract ideas. The fourth
chapter examines how writers and politicians, accepting that opposing ideas
could not be kept out of circulation, sought to arm readers by lengthy engagement with opponents' arguments.
Milton's writings are viewed against this complex series of contexts. Even
though his immediate concerns may have shifted a great deal in the 1640s
and 50s, "Milton was surprisingly committed to a single goal, that of making
his public fit to achieve self-governance through training in virtue." Areopagitica fits very well into her argument as a tract which makes the act of read625
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ing into a heroic struggle, a paean to the emergent public sphere. Eikonoklastes engages in a process of hermeneutical correction which, as Achinstein
shows :ill an interesting section, is developed :in the visual imagery of Paradise Lost. Milton's epic is difficult to historiciz€, partly because it once seems
to offer topical anchorings and then disconcertingly unmoors itself from
them. Achinstein offers one such example, a neglected genre of "Parlimnent
of Hell" satires in which Parliamentarian leaders aTe presented in terms similar to Milton's Satan and fallen angels. This analogy is for Achinstein part of
a "repeated strategy of provoking allegorical interpretations while refusing
to supply an uneqUivocal 'key' to the allegory," and thus educating fit readers. Similarly, the image of the sun both presents and subverts the kinds of
easy link between natural and cosmic orders that were being made by postRestoration royalists.
Achinstein thus offers us a Milton who, far from standing aloof from the
cornnl0n herd, was passionately cOlnmitted to involving them into his own
struggles. She offers a new and thought-provoking angle on the connections
between poetry and revolutionary politics. Whether commenting on Milton
or on little-known pamphlets, she writes with wit and energy. There are
great strengths in her method of concentrating on the process of reading
rather than merely classifying the different political alignments. There may,
however, be attendant problems. She does not depart as far as might initially
be expected from Fish's somewhat abstract model of reading: we are dealing
in the main with ideal types, and, while Lilbume and Milton figure in this
book, we are not given Lilburne's comments on the First Defence. Some of the
alignments produced by this focus on the hermeneutics of reading look
rather odd: for example, members of the Hartlib circle are linked with royalists in their fear of the Babel of political revolution, yet a linguistic politics
that from today's perspective may appear conservative did not necessarily
entail a conservative stance on questions of religion and politics. Achinstein
is much concerned with the concept of propaganda, and distinguishes its
one-sidedness from the more open search for truth that for her characterizes
truly revolutionary reading. Yet it may be that one problem in understanding Milton's historical position has been the desire to mark off his lofty idealism from the vulgar polemics of more engaged figures. William Empson was
being characteristically perverse when he tried to show that Milton had
foisted a forged prayer into Eikol1 Basilike in order to discredit the king, yet
he was recalling his own delight in tl1e possibilities of black propaganda
when working with the B.B.C. in wartime. Empson's awareness of the constraints, and also the challenges, of writing for a definite cause is an important aspect of the period that is in danger of getting lost when the dominant
hermeneutic ideal is one of open-mindedness.
Historians of reading have to account for the fact that the lofty Milton was
a close friend of the arch-propagandist and turncoat Marchamont Nedham.
In Milton and the Revolutionary Reader Nedham and other representatives of
the emergent periodical press remain somewhat shadowy figures, and it
must be said that Achinstein's handling of journalism reflects the deeply undeveloped state of research on that topic, with a number of minor inaccuracies. Milton's links with Nedham reinforce Achinstein's refreshing challenge
to conventional ideas of Milton's elitism. On the other hand, there may still
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be problems in Milton's particular relationship with the public sphere that
mark him off from many of the pamphleteers Achinstein discusses. She
writes that Milton stages the argument in Areopagitica "as if he were pleading before the Athenian Areopagus, a public place where ordinary mens'
voices would be welcome"; but the Areopagus was an aristocratic counterweight to the democratic Assembly, and Isocrates, Milton's generic model
here, praised it because it might contain popular unruliness. Just what that
allusion is doing in the pamphlet remains a matter of much debate, and it
need not invalidate Achinstein's general analysis: as she says, Milton is concerned with an ideal audience of the political future, and such an audience
could take on board both democratic openness and a sense of the need for
social discipline. All the same, the welcome that Milton afforded to the public sphere had well-defined limits. Charting and understanding those limits
is an important further task; but Achinstein has made a major contribution
both to setting Milton in history and to opening up histories that moved beyond Milton's own frames of reference.

Magdalen College, Oxford

David Norbrook

In the Theatre of Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women, by Julie A. Carlson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + 267. $49.95.
Poetic drama has long been considered the problem child of the Romantic
canon. Critics have so often dismissed, ridiculed, explained away and (more
cruelly still?) apologized for the genre that it can feel disorienting to come
upon Goethe's unstinting admiration for Mnnfred, or Coleridge's for The Borderers, or Shelley's for Cain-tempting one to still one's cognitive dissonance
by convicting the whole set of mutual flattery. Revisionist attempts to rescue
at least some examples of Romantic drama from a tradition of malign neglect
have been most successful when cutting the Unatural" link between drama
and theater and reconceptualizing the genre as "mental theater" (Byron's
term) rather than "closet drama," experiments in generic hybridity (Mnnfred
is subtitled a "dramatic poem," Prometheus Unbound a "lyrical drama")
rather than stage plays manques. Inevitably, the revisionist line has recently
come in for revision itself, by critics mOTe interested in issues of theatricality
and performativity and in the relation of both to historical and social change
in an era that witnessed the theatricalization of politics and the politicization
of theater. Julie Carlson's In the Theatre of Romanticism is the most substantial
and authoritative of these newer studies; it usefully alters the terms for criticism of Romantic drama and makes the genre seem not only worth sustained attention (what isn't these days?) but exciting, even trendy-no apologies here. Even more impressive, Carlson has made the study of Romantic
drama seem vital precisely because, not in spite of, its reputation as "bad theatre" (2).
Carlson renders theater central rather than marginal to Romantic-Era British culture in several overlapping ways. Drawing on the work of cultural
historians of the French Revolution, Carlson argues that political and theatri-
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cal forms of representation come to inform one another and manifest a
shared problematic on both sides of the channel during the period of the Revolutioary and NapoleOnic wars. Theater, as public spectacle, also becomes a
crucial site for the formation and display of a new British national ethos to
counter the no less spectacularized threat of a newly consolidated French
Nation. The Romantic poet's theater, with its all too well-known disproportian of thought to action, of metaphysics to stage business, becomes a forum
for publicly working out the relation of introspection to performance, of
theory to exection, in a period of violence and accelerated change. Finally,
gender comes (literally) into play in Carlson's study as action and the performing body become female-identified, lyricism and the philosophic mind
become coded as male. Romantic antitheatricalism is reinterpreted as an
ideologically overdetermined locus of social conflict rather than a pragmatic
response to inadequate stage conditions, with anti-revolutionary, antiNapoleonic, and misogynistic valences, not to mention a touch of class
anxiety.
Carlson resituates Romantic drama not only through her tum-or as Carlson herself, over-enamored of the coy parenthesis, might put it, (re)turn-to
theater, but also by giving Coleridge, usually upstaged by Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley, the best part of her attention. She argues compellingly that
far from representing a turn away from politics, Coleridge'S theory of imagination is deeply invested in questions of nationalism, that the formation of
"nation" and "imagination" are "mutually constitutive processes" (33).
Shakespeare, "England's master mind" (17), is deployed by Coleridge not
only as a model for nation-building through theatrical representation and as
national icon in himself, but also as exemplar, particularly in Hamlet, of the
anatomy of mind in an age of revolutionary upheaval and intensified commercial activity, teaching England to reflect before it acts, "making theatre a
reform school for the public mind" (5). In this account, Germany becomes a
necessary detour en route to the intersection of England, Shakespeare, and a
reformed and reforming drama, as Schiller anticipates the "turn to theatre to
redress [Revolutionary] social upheaval" in his Wallenstein plays, two of
which Coleridge translated in 1800. Schiller demonstrates how the esthetic
mode, in its very detachment, can annul former principles of action "so that
one can envision, and then effect, new alternatives" (76), though Wallenstein
also evinces the dilemma involved in moving from introspection to action
such that by acting, "humans alienate themselves from their ideal selves"
(77). Coleridge'S plays variously thematize, stage, and seek to evade this
moment of self-alienation and problematize notions of action, illusion, and
representation in the process.
Carlson's readings of Coleridge's verse dramas are convincing and make a
signal contribution to Coleridge studies, impelling one to find new interest
in these relatively neglected works (and making Zapolya seem interesting is a
neat trick all by itself). Coleridge'S dramatic career is divided into three
phases: a youthful one, represented by The Fall of Robespierre and Osorio, in
which vengance plays a legitimate function, though an rather vexed one in
the latter work; a middle phase, represented by Remorse (the revised Osorio),
in which physical violence is rejected, remorse (in the service of selfreformation) displaces revenge, and yet action remains attractive for its man-
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ifestation of male "potency" (105); and a final (post-Napoleonic) phase, represented by Zapolya, in which a nation's legitimate rulers are restored without vengeance and action is nearly entirely given over by contemplative men
in favor of active women. This last phase both culminates and curtails Coleridge's adventure with the stage, as the spectacle of female agency embodied
in the theater (with the concomitant feminization of the introspective male
hero) engenders an antitheatrical reflex in the male poet that is repeated in
contemporary male criticism of Shakespeare productions and again in criticism of Romantic drama that would decouple theater and text.
How well does Carlson's refocalizing of Romantic drama through Coleridge, nationalism, and gender serve as a basis for rethinking the genre (if
genre it can be called) as a whole? Insofar as the "problematics of action in a
revolutionary age" (99) which Carlson delineates to such effect in Coleridge
can be seen in works like Byron's Mnrino Faliero and Sardanapalus or in Shelley's Cenci (and implicitly in Wordsworth's Borderers, though Carlson doesn't
spell this out), the approach succeeds quite well and lends a new sense of
continuity to this group of texts. But the emphasis on theatricality also draws
attention away from several works that have long been considered the most
successful examples of a markedly uneven genre. A study of Romantic verse
drama that shows more interest in Marino Faliero than in Cain, that finds
room for atho the Great but not for Manfred, that requires an extended discussion of Zapolya but cannot accommodate Prometheus Unbound, finally
seems as skewed as earlier studies which proved unable to do justice to Remorse and Sardanapalus. What seems needed now are studies that can follow
Carlson's lead in recovering the significance of the theater and of theatricality for Romantic-era poets attempting to renew the drama, while keeping
sight of their interest not simply in juxtaposing lyric and dramatic modes
but in complicating or even collapsing the generic border between them,
sometimes leaving the stage behind (though not without Significant traces) in
the process. If Carlson's lead should not be followed blindly, however, In the
Theatre of Romanticism remains, for now, the best guide we have to understanding the Significance of dramatic poetry in the romantic era.

Boston College

Alan Richardson

Wordsworthian Errancies: The Poetics of Cultural Dismemberment by David Collings. Baltimore and London: The Johns HOpkins University Press, 1994. Pp.
xii + 287. $39.95.
If one requirement of canonical longevity is the author's capacity to speak
to the critical concerns of whatever age in which his or her texts may reside,
David Collings's Wordsworthian Errancies gives clear signs that Wordsworth
will be with us well into the next millennium. Drawing on a wide range of
contemporary cultural and literary theory, as well as current (and not so current) Wordsworth critics, David Collings shows how many of Wordsworth's
most discussed texts anticipate many of today's critical trends, in particular
Lacanian psychoanalysis, cultural deconstruction, and, most provocatively,
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queer studies. Although occasionally marred by weak argument, Collings's
book is a brave and largely successful attempt to bring Wordsworth's text
into dialogue with the critical avant-garde.
Squaring off against those who would contain Wordsworth's poetry
through historicist critique, Collings offers up a post-modern Wordsworth,
arguing that the poet "is far more outrageous than readers have generally
recognized, that he not only champions deviance and a nearly overt homoeroticism but links them intimately with his status as a poet" (13). Focussing
on Wordsworth's literal and figurative wanderings, Collings shows how the
poet's concern with cultural dislocation (or dismemberment) gradually develops into the primary source of his poetic power. This perverse empowerment occurs in several discernable stages, each dramatized in particular
poetic works: In the Salisbury Plain poems Wordsworth moves from conventional anti-war protest poetry, to a gothic-oriented preoccupation with cultural dislocation itself. While intimating the "illegitimacy of the symbolic
order" (59) in The Borderers, Wordsworth also criticizes those who, like its
central character, "would choose for cultural dismemberment" (66). Cultural
critique turns inward in "Incipient Madness," The Ruined Cottage, and "The
Thorn," poems in which the "vacillation of the subject" (77) becomes a
source of masochistic pleasure. Such pleasure, and the feeling of control associated with it, is more directly courted in "The Discharged soldier," "The
Cumberland Beggar," and the later drafts of The Ruined Cottage, while, in
Part One of the 1799 Prelude, "cultural disaster" and the poet's "mashochistic
vocation" (118) are conjoined in the pleasurable pain characteristic of the
spots of time. In Michael, Wordsworth's developing sense of the problematics
of culture" thwarts his best attempts to pass that culture on, and, in an especially inSightful analysis of The Prelude's "Arab dream" and "the crossing
of the alps" episodes, we find Wordsworth recognizing the apocalyptic
power of deviancy, something which, through the inadequacy of language,
he calls "imagination" (199). Appropriately, Collings rounds out his discussion of Wordsworth's errancy with a discussion of The Prelude's French Revolution chapters, whose medley of genres demonstrates the poet's sense that
history is ultimately unreadable. Indeed, as Wordsworth's celebration of Robespierre's beheading suggests, "history" achieves its primary meaning not
through objective representation, but through primitive forms of ritual, in
particular the versions of human sacrifice which, as Collings points out,
haunt Wordsworth's work.
As many readers will perceive, Collings's walk through Wordsworth's
wild side is, in itself, not radically new. Peckham's dark romanticism" has
found treatment before-especially in Bloom and Hartman, the latter perhaps vying with de Man as Collings'S primary influence. Nevertheless, Collings does manage to enmesh these themes in the Lacanian fractured self, the
post-structnral always already collapSing linguistic or cultnral order, as well
as the masochistic strand of queer studies. These theories allow Collings to
make surprising connections betvveen the poems he treats. To be sure, a few
of Collings more hyperbolic interpretations-especially his fresh take on The
Prelude's rowboat episode (137)-would be enough to make Matthew Arnold
blush, if not send into cardiac arrest. Moreover, for all his comments on
Wordsworth's rhetoric, Collings, like many de Man-inspired critics, seems to
II
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know little of the eighteenth-century rhetorical theory which informs Wordsworth's concepts of language, self, and culture.
This having been said, there is a great deal in Collings's book which, while
often not completely persuasive, does, like any good pioneering work, point
to territory which future critics will settle more securely. Not only is Wordsworth's canonical stature assured, but what is more exciting, so is our continuing sense of the poet's unfathomable strangeness.

Hofstra University

Scott Harshbarger

Literature, Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780-1832 by
Alan Richardson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xviii +
327. $54.95
The Cambridge Studies in Romanticism series includes both reconsiderations of major Romantic writers and provocative accounts of the importance
of less familiar, certainly less taught figures, including Helen Maria Williams
and William Cobbett. Alan Richardson's book is a welcome mixture of both
trajectories: a thorough, well-researched investigation of the education debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, offering extensive
commentary on "popular" didactic literature by figures such as Hannah
More and Maria Edgeworth, Literature, Education, and Romanticism also describes the (canonical) ROlnantic response to and representation of childhood,
reading, education, and "ideology" ("ideology," as Richardson reminds us, is
a term that emerged from post-Revolutionary debates about education). The
idea is to situate a specifically "Romantic" literary production within the context of a more general cultural revolution; Richardson is less interested, however, in travelling the well-trodden ground of political and industrial transformation than in carefully describing educational institutions-he regards
"literature" as an educational institution-crucially involved in developing a
"consensual" model of subject-formation. As he points out, "we tend now to
think of literacy in terms of democratization or even 'empowerment'" (65),
but Richardson demonstrates how educational reforms and print culture designed to universalize literacy also worked to subordinate not only children,
but also women, the working classes, and colonial subjects.
The chronological dimensions of Richardson's project are, he declares, determined less by an uncritical adoption of traditional literary-historical versions of the Romantic "era" than by his sense of a "revolution in schooling":
by 1832, universal literacy was an avowed aim of liberal thinkers and consensual rather than "repressive" models of learning had come to dominate,
models which meant that fantasy and imaginative literature in general had a
greater role to play in subject-formation. This framing enables Richardson to
equate Romanticism with "the emergence of 'Literature' as such, a cultural
institution predicated on a canonical set of 'imaginative' works, disseminated through schools and centralized publishing venues, and managed by a
professional group of critics and interpreters" (31). Thus the relation between
literature and education is "not simply a matter of setting a literary fore-
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ground against a social-historical background," since literature "play[sl a
material role in education" (33). In Richardson's account, the debate about
what role, if any, imaginative literature or fantasy should play in children's
education is absolutely central to understanding both the ideological dimensions of education reform and the formal dimensions of Romantic literature.
If readers familiar with Althusser recognize in educational institutions and
consensual models of subject-formation merely the "ideological" technologies of power, Richardson's thorough investigation of the historical field
means to complicate broad theoretical claims by calling attention to the proliferation of ideas of education and kinds of literature; as he points out, "reproduction theories cannot by themselves explain the development over time
of such systems" (27). Nor are the ideological effects of a given system of
education or literary text always clear. In the first two chapters of Richardson's book, which survey, respectively, ideas of childhood and the related
education reforms of the late eighteenth century, we learn that the historical
decline of grammar schools and instruction in classical languages is related
to the rise of the "consensual" ideology of education. As he points out in reviewing the influential educational theories of Locke and Rousseau, rote
learning was inimical to a consensual model of subject-formation: how could
the child "agree" to the authority of a text if she or he could not understand
it? Rationalist reformers therefore aimed, and were ably assisted in this aim
by children's book publishers, to follow Locke's dictum that children be
taught to reason "always in very few and plain words" (56). If Rousseau was
more extreme in his rejection of books themselves as instruments of childhood education (even Robinson Crusoe was recommended only as a series of
"object" lessons), the idea was the same: children, he argued in Emile, should
be surrounded with objects of sense, which do not require "belief." Modulating Rousseau's position, the Edgeworths in Practical Education insist on an
instruction that at least pairs words to definite things or concepts, therefore
rejecting both fairy tales and poetry as reading materials for children, opposfig "the common practice of having children memorize or recite poetryrl
(57), since the child's vocabulary would thereby outstrip his or her sense of
the word's meaning.
Thus although "writers in the rationalist tradition and their Romantic critics are joined," Richardson writes, in their opposition to technologies of
memorization (60), the consensual model, in positing an equation between
learning information and understanding, is crucially at odds with Romantic
education by the sublime. To illustrate "Romantic" criticism of the "systems"
proposed by reformers like Edgeworth and Lancaster, Richardson quotes
Southey's The Doctor: "Oh! What blockheads are those wise persons who
think it necessary that a child should understand everything it reads" (5).
Unsurprisingly, Romantic poets defended the importance of fantasy against
the "efficiency" models of the rationalist educators, but Richardson points
out the double valence of this defense. On the one hand, when Wordsworth
and Coleridge "propose that the child be left by itself to confront gaps and
limitations in its habitual thinking process" (57), they defend resistance to a
remorselessly programmatic and normativized learning process; on the other
hand, their tendency to represent the folk or fairy tale as an extension of "na-
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tural" education is a "subtly conservative" (123), ahnost Burkean reaction to
the radical agenda of some educational reformers.
Richardson wants to suggest that Romantic literature potentially occupies
"an ideologically neutral 'open ground' between the radical pamphlet and
the reactionary tract" (123)-also between the didactic lesson and the fairy
tale or chapbook-because it utilizes the very "gaps" between language and
meaning that lead rationalist educators and children's literature writers to
censor riddles, puns, and satire. But he has some difficulty in locating the
irony that would distinguish the Romantic text and subvert the goal of informing a stable subject. For example, Blake's "The Little Black Boy" supposedly critiques the discourse of colonialism, using a "scene of maternal
instruction" (165) to reverse the black boy's relation to the English child,
"placing him in the role of instructor" (164). But this role reversal, as
Richardson's subsequent consideration of the "Madras" system of studenttutors makes clear, can also be read as an internalization of authority rather
than its subversion.
While the rationalist premises of educational reform were often criticized by
the Romantics, Richardson underscores their more ambivalent relation to the
larger understanding of education as an institution of for the reproduction of
social and cultural power. For example, the same Wordsworth who criticized
educational reformers as "skilful usurers of time" and "wardens of our
faculties" would later be, like Coleridge, an ardent supporter of the so-called
"Madras" system of education, developed in India by Andrew Bell for the
subaltern population. Richardson's analysis of the Madras system is
faScinating, without question the most valuable part of the book. Romantic
writers compare Bell's reform (and the parallel system developed by the
Quaker, Joseph Lancaster) to (a) the steam-engine (Coleridge) and (b) the
printing press (Southey and Wordsworth). These analogies are quite telling,
insofar as they suggest that the subject-formation envisioned by the new
pedagogy was allied both to the goal of industrial "progress" and to the
conditions of print culture; Coleridge'S despised "reading Public" was
indeed a Public produced by the systematization of reading and writing.
Indeed, on almost every count, Richardson's overview of the context of the
Romantic production of "literature" seems authoritative, well-researched
and plaUSible. In Chapter III, surveying the children's literature produced in
the period, he describes the publishing industry's response not only to the
reform of education but also to its domestication; parental oversight of
children's education demanded the proliferation of materials for home
consumption. In Chapter IV, considering that other internal "subaltern"
population, women, in relation to education reform, Richardson finds an
interesting way to discuss not the women writers for the adult market who
have been the mainspring of so much recent feminist work, but instead the
so-called "Mrs. Teachwells" (Maria Edgeworth, Anna Barbauld, Eliza
Fenwick) who reduced the fairy tale to a didactic instrument. In discovering
an underlying association "of maternal with pedagOgical power" (167),
Richardson might have profited from knowledge of Friedrich Kittler's
brilliant chapter on late eighteenth-century German theories of teaching
literacy, called "The Mother's Mouth," in Discourse Networks 1800/1900, but
his narrow focus does have the advantage of providing numerous rewarding
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anecdotes; we learn that both Mary Shelley and Elizabeth Villiers, a fictional
character in Charles Lamb's Mrs. Leicester's School, are taught to read by their
fathers by tracing the letters on their mothers' gravestones (78, 134). In the
last chapter, on educational institutions and literature developed for the
working classes, Richardson again manages to forge a series of convincing
parallels: the child who will be "informed" by proper educational methods
and materials serves a model for the worker who will assimilate habits of
frugality and industry from adult eqUivalents of "Little Goody Two-Shoes"
found in Harriet Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economy; moreover, as
Richardson points out, Martineau "favors colonial settings" (228), thereby
reinforcing the equation between the domestic and the colonial subaltern.
VVl:lat distinguishes Literature, Education, and Romanticism is the astute and
persuasive case it makes for the relevance of education debates about what
and how children should read to discussions of the subject-formation and
assimilation of colonized populations, women, and the working class. If this
is an attempt to "race, class, and gender" the Romantic child, it is certainly
not a programmatic one; at every rurn, Richardson attempts to nuance our
sense of an "ideologically diverse" (111) literary production by providing us
with a richly detailed context that establishes a conflicted rather than unitary
model against which to measure Romantic representation. However, when
Richardson attempts to cash in on his painstaking historical analysis, the results are sometimes disappointing. He discusses very few unexpected texts,
and, with the exception of The Prelude, not a single long poem at any length.
Nor does his extensive knowledge always prevent erroneous assertions. For
example, his "reading of the archive" (10) enables him usefully to refine
Lawrence Stone's four conventions for representing childhood; he describes
the "transcendental" child of Romantic poetry as well as a "maternal" convention, "marked by a unique attentiveness to the infant's body, the dangers
involved in birthing it. . and the bond between child and mother" (12).
Implicitly, Richardson opposes these latter two conventions; explicitly, he
finds the maternal convention "only among women writers of the era" (11).
Such a claim necessarily overlooks evidence to the contrary in Wordsworth's
"The Mad Mother" and "The Forsaken Indian Woman," to say nothing of accounts of (failed) surrogate nurturing by fathers in "Michael" and
"Vaudracour and Julia." This would be a minor objection were it not for the
fact that Richardson uses the absence of this "maternal convention" partly to
characterize Romantic representation, described as "oddly disembodied"
(15). But a parallel for Baillie's slobbering "varlet" can be found in Blake's
"Infant Sorrow," as Barbauld's baby made "invisible" by the womb calls attention to Wordsworth's conflation of maternity and supernarure in "The
Thorn."
Sometimes Richardson merely overstates his case, as with reading Frankenstein as a "critique of female education" (204); while Richardson's contention
that Walton's haphazard reading "allies him with most women of the
period" is persuasive, especially given what we know of Mary Shelley,
describing the novel as representing "the dilemma of the middle-class adolescent girl, caught between equally unhappy alternatives" of haphazard education and a repressive disciplinary regime (205) is too obviously thesisdriven. At other times, especially with Lyrical Ballads, he seems unaware of
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relevant secondary work: there are no citations of Frances Ferguson, for example, though she has written on Anna Barbauld's Lessons for Children in relation to "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and her dialectical" reading of
"We Are Seven" would have complicated Richardson's presentation of the
poem as a simple conflict betvveen education by nature and by culture. And,
while Richardson's synthetic procedure of discussing "popular" literature
with the same intelligence and energy he devotes to its canonized relative is
admirable and productive, it sometimes occasions missteps. A plot sununary
of Fenwick's Juvenile Library or (especially) Edgeworth's "The Birth-day Present" is both needful and valuable; a plot summary of Mansfield Park is considerably less so. Almost always, Richardson pr6ves sharper on the less familiar texts. Nonetheless, Literature, Education, and Romanticism provides, as
its author had hoped, a valuable way of looking at "some of the channels
through which Wordsworth's poetry passed on its way to becoming canonical" (263).
1/

University of California, Berkeley

Celeste Langan

Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Contemporary Theory edited by
Tilottarna Rajan and David 1. Clark. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1995. Pp. vii + 386. $21.95.

This collection of fourteen essays by different writers beginS with an introduction by the editors stating that the book's purposes include "recovering
the philosophical idealism that contemporary theory rejects, but that is nevertheless dialogically present within it" (6). The book concludes with Stanley
Corngold's contention (in his essay "On Death and the Contingency of Criticism: Schopenhauer and de Man") that "it is urgent now to reacquaint ourselves, with due intensity, with the human subject" (375).
The purposes and the quality of writing in the volume's fourteen essays
are diverse in the extreme. In this review, I -will briefly indicate the contents
of three of these esssays (by Christopher Norris, Rajan, and Andrew Bowie)
which I regard as especially valuable contributions to the field, but I will
mention at the outset that other contributors to the volume are John Sallis
(who writes on Hegel and mimesis), David 1. Clark (on Schelling'S Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom), Judith Butler (on bodily
subjection in Hegel's Phenomenology), Ned Lukacher (comparing Nietzsche
and Freud on conscience and the will to power), Thomas Pfau (on moral
agency and critical discourse), Arkady Plotnitsky (on a general theoretical
framework associated with Hegel, quantum mechanics, and the theory of the
unconscious), Eric Meyer (on postmodernity and romantic historicism), Paul
Hamilton (on Sade and Stendhal as they anticipate more recent thinking
about ideology), Jean-Pierre Mileur (affirming that M. H. Abrams, Harold
Bloom, and British poets are practical whereas The Literary Absolute by
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, like the German romantic writing which that
book treats, is theoretical), Mark Cheetham (comparing Derrida and Kant on
"the sublime"), and Stanley Corngold (whose manifesto for "the human subject" ends with the slogan, "Just say 'No' to contingency" [375]).
Norris's "Kierkegaard, de Man, and the Ethics of Reading" suggests that
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Kierkegaard's pseudonymous and aesthetic writings covertly serve religion
and edification, "ensnaring the reader in fictions and speculative arguments
that would ultimately self-deconstruct" (39). "Kierkegaard carries deconstruction only to the point where its strategies supposedly come up against
an undeconstructible bedrock of authenticated truth" (41). However, citing
de Man's argument about narrative performativity in Rousseau's writing,
Norris observes that Kierkegaard's work and its ethical intent are liable to
"further deconstructive reading" (57).
Rajan's essay, "Language, Music, and the Body: Nietzsche and Deconstruction," asks, "in what ways is Nietzsche different from de Man's representation of him?" (147-48). Rajan suggests that Julia Kristeva offers a very
different version of Nietzsche's importance: Kristeva "draws from the later
Nietzsche a concern with the body as the material site of the unconscious"
(153); Nietzsche's earlier works (via Kristeva) give "poetic language a centrality it does not have" in later works (153-54). Referring to music and the
body, Nietzsche "valoriz[esJ differance over logos" and "gives it a materiality
it lacks in a critical practice that posits nothing outside the text" (155). Rajan
explains "the semiotic in terms of Kristeva's difference from Lacan: "because of its association with the mother's body, the semiotic is also linked
with a return to something more inward than the world of symbols constructed by the law of the father" (162). Kristeva's account "endows this deconstruction with an experiential rather than a purely linguistic dimension
(163). And a "valorization of the aesthetic marks Kristeva's deconstruction as
a form of romanticism" (165).
Bowie's '''Non-Identity': The German Romantics, Schelling, and Adorno"
is probably the only essay in the collection that all professional philosophers
(however analytical) would recognize as thoroughly philosophical in its
purposes and methods. Bowie argues that Adorno's conception of "nonidentity" is "simply wrong in one vital respect" (244). In German idealism
after Kant, the dualism of world-in-itself and our knowledge was supposedly overcome by methods that "end up repressing the object side of the dialectic." But "it is not possible to overcome the split of thinking and being
from one side of the divide between the two." Both Schelling and Friedrich
Schlegel "saw the consequences of this fact" as Hegel and Adorno did not
(246). "Both Schelling and Adorno are convinced that Hegel too readily assimilates everything into thought" (253); but in Negative Dialectics"Adorno
has really just inverted Hegel, by now attributing the prior role of the subject in Hegel to the object" (255). Bowie concludes that "if the idea of nonidentity is to be appropriately understood ... it should not lead, as so much
recent theory has, and some of Adorno's philosophical writings do, to the
repression of subjectivity via the reduction of the subject to the happening of
language or society" (259).
From a scholarly point of view, one notices that (with rare and brief exceptions) the only historical context constructed in Intersections involves the
comparison of one writer's abstract statements with another's. During decades of political revolution, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schlegel, and
others among the German writers here treated were involved in some important woddy conflicts, and their writings participate in these conflicts in ways
that the book's essays do not indicate. Schelling's Philosophical Inquiries into
ff
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the Nature of Human Freedom (to mention only one example) takes in senses
of the word "freedom" which are not as metaphysical as the reflections
about the abyss of groundless unbeing which Clark offers in his essay on
that treatise. In 1809, there was an obviously political dimension to Schelling's statement that "what had initially been unruly had been brought to order" (I quote James Gutmann's translation, 34), but that fact could hardly be
guessed from a reading of Intersections.
The essays in Intersections refer often to de Man: for example, Norris's use
of de Man's work is astute in framing his perceptive critique of Kierkegaard's writings; but Rajan explicitly prefers Kristeva over de Man, and
Corngold's defensive manifesto for "the human subject" represents de Man
as a tlueat (because of de Man's insistence on contingency). An odd omission
from the scholarly apparatus is the work of Gilles Deleuze, who is mentioned in a couple of lists of names, but whose work isn't cited at all: even
apart from his Difference and Repetition, and aside from Anti-Oedipus and A
Thousand Plateaus (both written collaboratively with Felix Guattari), Deleuze's books include full-length commentaries on Kant and Nietzsche which
also have independent philosophical importance.
In terms of the quality of philosophical descriptions, the variety among the
essays is remarkable. Cheetham's understanding of Kant's negative account
of "noumena" in connection with the "sublime" is commendable; and one
need not share Bowie's view of Adorno and Hegel to admire the precision
and clarity of his formulations. But whereas Bowie can qulte correctly state
the negatively critical content of Kant's work with regard to putative "knowledge of things in themselves" (246), Clark's statement about "Kant's separation of real and phenomenal worlds" involves a serious philosophical mistake (91). Kant distingulshes phenomena (which are as real as we can get)
from noumena, which, Kant says, are merely illusions of the human faculty
of reason which is all the while occupied only with itself.
I will mention only one other example of the quality of philosophical
thinking represented in the other essays in Intersections: when Pfau writes
that Hegel "redescribe[s] morality as social and discursive practice rather
than as an inward presence ('conviction')" (230), it is not clear whether Pfau
means to say simply that Hegel refers to such a description of morality, or
whether Pfau means to say that Hegel affirms that (as a matter of fact) morality is a social practice rather than an inner conviction, or whether Pfau
means to assert his own agreement with Hegel in either case. Does Pfau
mean to assert that it was Hegel's inner conviction that morality is not a
matter of inner conviction? Clearly Hegel could articulate a description of a
particular concept of morality (or anything else) without believing or asserting that morality itself is identical with the description; the features of a description do not necessarily belong to the thing described. In fact, it is Hegel's customary way of proceeding to consider ways of conceiving things,
rather than things. Perhaps Pfau means to assert that there is no such thing
as morality external to assertions about it; or perhaps he means to affirm that
Hegel said such a thing. But it is not clear from Pfau's essay what is being
said here.
When I think as an editor, I notice that some of the essays (by Norris, Rajan, Hamilton, Bowie) are impressively well written and edited, and some
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others are not. One of the essays (Clark's) is 68 pages long (about 100 pages
in typescript), consisting of sentences whose obscurity would have prompted
some editors to ask for stylistic work as well as abridgement. Other essays
include uncorrected problems in subject-verb agreement, dating of sources,
grammatical structure of sentences, and spelling; but my own experience as
a coeditor of scholarly collections has taught me that recent changes in the
procedures of scholarly publication have confused the division of labor in
ways that have not always been good for the quality of editing.
In their writing and in the quality of their arguments, however, the best of
the essays in this collection are outstanding. In my view, the relationships
between nineteenth-century philosophy and contemporary theory are as important as the editors and contributors indicate, and the book's contributions
include both salutary emphasis on that general set of issues and some exemplary specific treatments.
Texas A&M University

Terence Allan Hoagwood

Healing the Republic: The Language of Health and the Culture of Nationalism in
Nineteenth-Century America by Joan Burbick. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 355. $59.95.

More than thirty books are published each year which consider conceptualizations of the human body. Many of these publications focus on bodily
representations as articulated synchronically in languages of related disciplines. Burbick's study precisely fits this recent and burgeoning intellectual
activity. Her main thesis centers on how the discourse of medicat legal, political, and literary writings reveals cultural assumptions and anxieties as inscribed in the common flesh of the body in nineteenth-century America, espeCially as interpreted by its middle-class spokespersons and authorities.
In fact, the rivalry among newly developing authorities is one of this
book's most interesting points. As Benjamin Rush's epoch of bloodletting
and cold-water cures (not to mention his suggested treatment for necrophobia: temporary burial in a coffin) was passing away, struggles for control
of the body's health raged fiercely, ranging from the phrenologists and mesmerists to the newly established American Medical Association (1847). Faced
with the collapse of local communities as bases of knowledge and advice,
many writers were suspicious of rising professionalism. Samuel 1110mson's
Narrative of the Life and Medical Discoveries (which saw thirteen editions after
its first printing in 1822) complained that the vacuum of traditional authority
had created a gullible public ripe for the plucking by predatory physicians.
Equally intriguing is how some reformers, while opposing the hegemony
of doctors, became as dictatorial as Hawthorne's Puritans. For Sylvester Graham, to cite one example, physiology took. on the status of sacred law
"which cannot be violated with impunity," he said, adding that no one can
"move nor breathe nor exercise volition without obeying or violating penal
laws." Mary Grove Nichols, a Graham sympathizer, wrote lectures, a novel,
textbook chapters, and reminiscences which argued for the authority of sci-
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enc€, rationality, and law predicated upon experts who would certify
whether such authority was being properly received.
In contrast, reformers like John C. Gunn (who wrote the most popular
medical care book in mid-nineteenth century America), Lydia Maria Child,
and Harriot Hunt promoted a democratic relationship between subject and
ruler. Cunn and Child converted garden herbs and kitchen contents into
domestic "tools" to be used in medical treatments and instruments. Hunt believed patients were capable of (and required to) "speak their disease." In a
symbiotic relationship, Hunt's patient and physician would develop a community of sympathy wherein "the little word WE" would help to effect recovery. First and foremost, the patient must learn "to utter yourself in confidence and trust" after searching for a language which enables such utterance. One can easily see how this medical opinion relates to literary and
historical matters including Dimmesclale's need to confess to his community,
Gilman's nervous monologue in "The Yellow Wallpaper," and William Seward's wife who, by acceding to her doctor's authority, allowed herself to be
bled to death.
These are some of the main issues in Healing the Republic's first section
whose purpose is to clarify general issues. Among other issues in this section
is the insistence that the body signified the nation. As Burbick puts it: "In
the language of health, if the individual could sustain well-being, sense disease, reflect, read, listen to good advice, and act properly f then a free society
could be upheld and, when necessary, healed." In doing so, it was necessary
to dissect and to disjoint various bodily parts. As Burbick explains: "In order
to construct social order and maintain hegemony, a topology of the body
emerged during this period that privileged particular parts of the body. The
brain, heart, nervous system, and eye became keys to health and natural
symbols that empowered particular groups to create systems of discipline,
self-control, and understanding for the individual. Each body part resonated
with a social philosophy and promoted forms of authority necessary for a
healthy nation."
Section Two of Burbick' 5 book attends to the values encoded in each of
these four body parts. The first and last chapters~the managing brain and
the technological eye-are the strongest parts of the entire book, and some
readers will be familiar with the former since a version of it was previously
printed in Prospects; An Annual of American Cultural Studies. In this Section,
Burbick asserts that Ahab conformed to a medical superintendent's warning
that the imbalance of the brain and the excessive ambition of "exceptional
men" resulted in social disorder, and Moby-Dick's definition of monomania
echoed the definition found in the Penny Cyclopaedia popular in Melville's
day. The unstable grammar and punctuation of Dickinson's verse was a
"nervous" language which challenged cerebral knowledge. The stomach,
nervous or otherwise, was often claimed as a tIna tural symbol" of the warring elements in cultural distress. The eye was assisted by numerous inventions-the zootrope, the phenakistiscope, the thaumatrope, the magic lantern, the daguerreotype-which transformed ordinary phenomena into the
spectacular and which, by dissociating scene from its viewer, promised
objective truth. Of particular interest is Burbick's account of the use of slides
in mental asylums to relieve boredom, to control patients' conduct, and to
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provide "evidence" to inmates of an independent, exterior world outside
their D"Wll subjectivity and delusion.
Anecdotal information is, in fact, this book's most attractive feature. Indeed, the information in the lengthy footnotes is often as usefu1r relevant
and as interesting as the material in the text. Some readers might find the
least attractive feature to be the book's frequent but wispy allusions to current theorists like Geertz, Bakhtin, Gramsci, and Foucaulti since these allusions are seldom developed, they distract from the anecdotal review. Still
other readers may have problems with Burbick's consideration of the nineteenth century in its entirety since the century is marked by vast literary and
cultural shifts and developments. The status of physician changed drastically
from the founding of the AMA in 1847 to 1905 when the medical profession
had gained all but complete mastery over the field, and literary emphases on
Romanticism's possibilities yielded to the Naturalist's obsession with law
and restriction.
One final characteristic of this book is its tendency to raise fascinating
questions which are summarily disposed of, leaving it to readers to construct
more complete and complex responses. For example, Burbick mentions in
passing that slaves were considered to have bodies different from AngloAmerican bodies, and one would like to have fuller discussion of this fascinating idea, including whether conceptions of slave bodies changed when
they gained freedom or if gender were a factor. Since Burbick performs excellent and thorough analysis of middle-class white women's role in
"Healing the Republic," one wishes her to match that achievement in the
book's other parts. This desire is felt most frequently whenever sex or economics are involved; fine ideas surface which all too quickly sink out of
sight. One wishes those ideas were either placed off the main path in footnotes or developed. That is, one wishes the book were either longer or
shorter than its 350 pages.
Still, Burbick proffers a wealth of material interlaced smoothly across
many textual disciplines. Perhaps her best contribution, aside from the anecdotal, is her faithful attention to the anxieties and tensions recorded in the
discourse on health in nineteenth-century America. One of the skillful passages wherein Burbick articulates this tension reads: "... the autonomous,
universal body did not unify the nation, but gave its citizens a grid upon
which they wrote their fears about the republic. The brain, heart, nervous
system, and eye as sites of the body created a rhetoric of health that struggled to establish order while revealing fundamental value conflicts. Body
sites valorized particular forms of labor, created hierarchies of race, class,
and gender, and offered solutions dependent upon kinship, conversion,
proper moral sensibility, and even genetic make-up." To a considerable degree, Burbick fulfills this ambitious thesis.
Wayne State University

Henry Golemba
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Fatal Women: Lesbian Sexuality and the Mark of Aggression by Lynda Hart.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. 201. $35.00, cloth; $14.95,
paper.
Incriminations: Guilty Women!felling Stories by Karen S. McPherson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. 215. $29.95.

In a recent issue of The Nation (February 20, 1995) devoted to the growth
of "The American Gulag: A Prison-Industrial Complex," Teresa Albor contributed an essay, "No Family Values Here: The Women Get Chains ...,"
which focuses on the state's incarceration of women without regard to the
fact that many are primary caretakers for small children. As part of her investigation she offers the following statistics: "More women are now sent to
prison than at any other time in the nation's history-the result, largely, of
mandatory sentencing minimums and other strict federal sentencing guidelines .... between 1983 and 1992 the number of incarcerated women tripled.
That's twice the rate of growth of the male prison population. ... They are
predominantly poor minority women who have been inadequately educated
and badly served in terms of health care. . . . Most women are in prison for
non-violent or drug-related offenses. About 32 percent are in for drug sales
or possession. Some 29 percent have committed crimes against property (larceny, theft, extortion, bribery or fraud) . .. . women in prison for violent
crimes are more than twice as likely as men to have victimized a relative or
intimate.... Those few women imprisoned for murder are likely to have
killed people who they say abused them." Even as women are perceived as
narrowing the gender gap in terms of numbers in prison, the motivation for
committing crimes and the kinds of crimes committed suggest that criminality remains highly inflected by gender, as well as race.
Two recent contributions to feminist scholarship consider the guilty
woman, guilty either of aggressive behavior and/or of incriminating herself,
as a way of shifting the blame away from the victim (of violence) to the figuration of culpability in a system where subordination in and of itself incites
suspicion and garners blame. Lynda Hart in Fatal Women begins with a cultural imaginary that finds women incapable of aggression. When women
achieve visibility as aggressive, they do so only by means of the appearance/ disappearance of the lesbian who lurks, in the shadow, as secret. The
impossibility of women's aggression is thus displaced onto the sexual aggressiveness of the female invert. The lesbian, by actively desiring, becomes
inherently criminalistic. The lesbian and the female offender share the effect
of inversion: born women they become men, since active desire and aggression remain the prerogatives of masculinity. But becoming a man is only
one way for woman to enter history as a criminal, although it is the one
that Hart highlights. The other way is for two women to commit a crime
together, the result of being too close. In this case it is not becoming a man
but doing without men altogether that incites criminal behavior. Hart reminds us that Lacan based his theory of the mirror stage on Christine and
Lea Papin, two sisters who as maids killed their female employer and her
daughter in France in 1933. Delire il deux, he called it.
According to Karen McPherson's work, Incriminations, women have been
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framed, made to embody both interdiction and transgression. They can only
plead guilty, like seventeenth-century witchducking, whereby women
floated if guilty and drowned if innocent. Incrimination is not proof of guilt
but it connects one to the "field of crime." To engage in storytelling may be
inherently self-incriminating. But is it the women or the stories who aTe telling and on whom? Are the women guilty of telling stories or of telling their
own stories? Or is someone telling on them? Narration, transgression and
gender are found to be inscribed as intertext in the novels of twentieth century women writers. By locating the policing-of women and of meaningone then is able to identify the prohibition and the violation, and thereby ascertain the imputed crime.
As contributions to feminist scholarship in the field of cultural representation both of these books not only shift the focus from victim to criminal but
also from flimages of women" as object of analysis to processes of signification whereby female subjectivity is the subject of an ongoing suspicion. Hart
is not looking for the lesbian behind the criminal, but for the lesbian's appearance and disappearance in the making visible of woman's aggression.
McPherson is not interested in the scene of the crime but in the arrival of the
police in as much as it can tell us something about what is being policed.
They are interested in the intersection of language and law only in as much
as it inscribes women as impossibility and puts them in an impossible situation. For Hart lesbianism begs the question: what does it mean to prohibit
something that doesn't exist? Desire between women can't exist if sexuality
can only be imagined as phallic; thus to crirninalize lesbianism would mean
to bring it into existence as discursive and thus sexual possibility. For McPherson women's writing begins with the question: what does it mean for
the story to be about not being able to tell the story? Women's voices have
been associated with nagging and gossip, with fatal seductions, with exceeding the narrations told to and for women. Telling a story becomes an act of
transgression because the very act of speaking incriminates the teller engaged in breaking the silence.
To not be interested in the image of woman as either victim or criminal,
but rather in the appearance of lesbianism or in the voices of women, means
also not to privilege the genre of crime-the mystery or thriller-as the site
of criminality in fictional discourse. Only one of the novels McPherson focuses on involves an historically documented crime, Anne's Hebert's Ka111ouraska, based on the murder of a man by his wife and her lover in Quebec
in 1839. In the other texts she discusses, Simone de Beauvoir's L'Invitee, Margeurite Duras's Le Ravissemel1t de Lal V. Stein and Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway, criminality takes various forms, ranging from gender as a pretext for
blaming to the resistance of a heterosexual imperative. In de Beauvoir, in the
absence of the inscription of police, the analysis begins with the proliferation
of a crime-related vocabulary in order to read the murder as a way of wiping out the real crime, that of betrayal. In Duras the criminal is inscribed in
textual strategies that create sound metonymies between the words cri, crise
and crime so that the "ravishing" takes the form of a violent act of displacement. In Hebert the passe simple narratologically buries the crime that insinuates itself on the present where the price of survival is guilt. In Woolf the
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policing is done by medical men who assign the guilty role to the madman
as both non-normative and scapegoat.

The readings McPherson offers are extraordinarily detailed and extremely
elegant. They assume that one has read these novels, preferably yesterday.
They inscribe the author in ingenious ways: by writing this novel de Beauvoir has killed Olga (as opposed to Sartre) on paper, but by dedicating it to
her fails to leave a body. They offer insightful observations into the relation
between language and power: in Hebert the language of the law is English
while the language of the crime is French. But the intense attention to words
on the page draws attention to the arbitrariness of the choice of texts:
L'Invitee has no police; Mrs. Dalloway has no crime. Woolf's text comes last
rather than first and is the only one written in English.
If history and cultural context don't matter, what about gender? The book
begins with a slight embarrassment about

fOCUSSing

on IIwomen's voices" as

oppositional strategy since as post-Derridean readers we recognize this trope
as belonging on the heap of "dead metaphors." It ends with the 1989 Montreal massacre where a single gunman shoots fourteen students at the Ecole
Polytechnique whom he has singled out as feminists. As well-trained readers
we can identify "dead metaphors." As feminists we want to speak out
against and on behalf of dead women. But will an unexamined investment
in explication de texte help us do that or will it just remind us that no matter
how well we read, we could still be shot for it, we might still be found dead,
we can never not be guilty of speaking?
Hart dedicates her book and devotes the last chapter to Eileen Wornos, the
first so-called female serial killer, who waits on death row for having confessed to killing seven white middle-aged men as a hitch-hildng prostitute.
She pleads self-defense, seeing nothing wrong with killing those who would
have killed her, and shows no remorse, even as she wishes it hadn't happened. The confession of her crime was for the sake of her lover, another

woman, and her redemption has taken the form of formal adoption by a
newly born Christian, again a woman. To make sense of this historical event

in terms of the criminal woman as both problem and solution to a male
homosocial economy, Hart returns to the Victorian villainness in Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret; the first homosexual woman on stage
who appears in Wedekind's Lulu plays; the repression of the lesbian in female buddy films, primarily Thelma and Louise; the aggression of Karen Finley'S performance art that makes it possible for her to join the censored
"NEA Four" as the only heterosexual; Single White Female as the fear on the
part of white men of their own non-reproduction by either African-American
women or lesbians; and Basic Instinct where the relationship between two
women makes it impossible to !mow which one committed the crime.
In this case the selection of texts seems less arbitrary because their reason
for being there has to do with a retelling of the master narrative, the Lacanian psychoanalytic one. The book begins by historicizing the invert of
sexology, the female offender of criminology and the narcissist of psychoanalysis by showing how they all inform each other at the tum of the 20th
century. Even as the law seeks to uncover the criminal's secret, which he

himself knows, and the psychoanalyst seeks to discover the hysteriC'S secret,
which is kept even from herself, in the end, Hart admits to agreeing with
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Lacan that Woman does not exist, except as man's symptom. If man's desire
is for desire, Woman as symptom is "the non-existent obstacle that functions
as the cause of man's desire" (133). Eileen Wuornos, then, refuses to function
as man's symptom and instead becomes his scapegoat. But does this tell us
anymore about the appearance of the first female serial killer OTvar€ we being
taught one more time how to read Lacan, this time with a little Zizek added?
Hart does make me think further about the representation of lesbianism as
both impossible and prohibited; as both autoeroticism and a desire that exceeds visual representation; as mutual masturbation and the pleasure
women have no reason to renounce; as both so invisible that it poses no
threat and so threatening that it becomes apocalyptic. Even as Hart makes
clear from the beginning that her focus is on the lesbian as white, a chapter
on race argues that this is so because the addition of racial difference would
produce an alterity more terrifying than pleasurable for the white heterosexual male imaginary. But did she learn all this from Lacan or from these Hollywood films? If a cultural studies approach expands the repertoire of texts,
then why limit their potential meanings to those offered by a single model of
reading? Woman does not exist can offer a useful theoretical construct for
countering liberal feminism's assumption of ontological sameness, but what
is the connection between that non-existence and a woman on death row? If
the book is dedicated to "all the women who have been vilified, pathologized, and murdered for defending themselves by whatever means necessary," what defense is there against the episternic violence of Lacanian psychoanalysis? Woman does not exist, just as the phallus can never be had. But
isn't the confusion between phallus and penis one way to represent male
sexual violence? In which case the confusion between The Woman and
women would be another way to understand why women can be made not
to matter.
Do I really want or need to know this much about these four novels? Do I
really want to have Lacan explained to me one more time? Reading each of
these books reminds me of what it is I am capable of understanding, but not
what it is that I want to know, or what it is that I should know to make
sense of this particular moment in history. I want to know what it means
that national focus has shifted from woman as victim to woman as criminal.
I want to know why it is happening now. I want to know what it feels like to
know (in the sense of Raymond Williams' "structures of feeling") that victims of violent crimes are women who haven't been able to defend themselves and that for women to defend themselves is still perceived as inherently transgressive. "What does this mean for academic feminism, twenty-five
years after women appropriated transgression as a means of liberation?
Either we notice the man with the gun before he shoots us (unlike Nicole
Simpson), or we point the gun at him, like Eileen Wuornos. Or, as writers,
we are left putting on the body of (the dead) Judith Shakespeare. Which is
what Woolf suggested, almost seventy years ago. Only this time honticide
has corne to replace suicide.
Which is what these books set out to do when they insist on "writing beyond the ending" in the form of an "afterword" (Hart) and a "post(modern)script" (McPherson). Is it any coincidence that both of them end by
discussing the texts of lesbian writers, Deb Margolin's Lesbians Who Kill and
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Nicole Brossard's Le desert ma1lve? Psychoanalytic theory reminds us that
Oedipus both desired and corrunitted a crime, that (incestuous) desire ,vas
not his only crime. But in as much as the lesbian is both impossible (within
psychoanalysis) and prohibited (by the law), maybe only she can speak from
the dead, and thus for the dead, at this particular moment, in history and in
the production of feminist knowledge. Meanwhile, other women, many with
children, mostly women of color, continue, in increasing numbers, to sit out
sentences in prison.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Anne Herrm'l.Im

Subjective Agency: A Theory of First-Person Expressivity and its Social Implications by Charles Altieri. Blackwell, Pp. ix + 306. $54.95.
Vamps and Tramps: New Essays by Camille Paglia. New York: Vintage, 1994.
Pp. xxv + 532. $15.00.
In his new book, Charles Altieri attempts to provide a theoretical account
of how people express and manage their identities, arrive at decisions, form
judgments, understand others, and in general make their way around. He
depicts himself as an outsider to philosophy, although three out of four Library of Congress headings under which the book is filed include the word
"Philosophy"; and says that he is chiefly concerned to map a middle ground
betvveen the "ascetic vigilance" of philosophical rigor, and the cultivation of
aesthetic "fascination." Neither traditional philosophy nor poetry, Altieri
contends, can do justice to the intricacy or value of human action; but between the tvvo lies a huge logical space in which an account of human
agency in all its dimensions from the psychological to the political, an account both rigorous and responsive, might be able to flourish. Subjective
Agency, Altieri claims, is that account.
Unfolding over seven dense and challenging chapters, the argument is
constructed as a realization of certain tendencies of what Altieri identifies as
the "expressivist tradition," whose primary representatives are said to be
Spinoza, Hegel, and Wittgenstein. Arn.ong the contributions of this tradition,
Altieri claims, is a refusal to embrace the dominant "Romantic" assumption
about the subject, that some definite but inchoate imler self struggles to
achieve expression in the form of articulate judgments, utterances, and actions. Altieri wants to redescribe the subject by eliminating all talk of in\vardness and concentrating on agency alone, which, he says, "performs
itself" as subjects will their identities by "enacting certain investments" or
by "shaping substance in contexts that recur" (87, 87, 110). "\Vill," he Sil).'S
in this vein, "is not a matter of inner life," but is "simply the aligning of conative energies with the world, so that they seem continuous with it and
effective within it" (50).
It really is simple, for everything lies on the perceptible surface, and is
largely manifest as "style," a term that carries the burden of indi\"iduation in
the nbsence of a deep interior core. As a way of approaching the full dimcn-
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sians of style, Altieri introduces Kantian aesthetics. Aesthetic shaping, Altieri
argues, can be understood as a model for the ways in which people create all
kinds of purposive structures; and aesthetic understanding can be adopted
as a template for the attribution of purposiveness, the way in which people
apprehend the internal relations of expressions" as the result of intentional
acts. In both instances, people experience an obligation to bring their "firstperson" dispositions into alignment with "third-person" or impersonal criteria of judgment, in the process defining and realizing themselves by appealing to communally held standards and modes of understanding.
From here, Altieri develops a skeletal ethic that focuses on "making the
symbolic more responsive to differences among practices and making agents
more capable of manipulating what the symbolic order can prOVide them as
powers and entitlements" (167). And then, in a final chapter, he spells out
"rno basic imperatives for politics" that follow on his account of subjective
agency: "that we foster institutions which keep continual pressure on us to
present justifications appealing beyond the circle where we are secure in our
assessments, and that we consider the fundamental political value to be the
activity of responding to such pressures civilly and with a desire for justice"
(230).
As the quoted passages may already have suggested, it is not inunediately
apparent exactly what this book does or why it does it. It does not describe
something that already exists, nor does it analyze, nor does it exhort. With a
few exceptions, it does not engage in detailed, extended critical readings of
other philosophers, even of Spinoza and Hegel, who are generally viewed
from a distance. What it does is generate arguments of great abstractness, often presented as adjustments of arguments from previous philosophers considered to be in the main friendly to the overall enterprise. And the reason it
does so is, apparently, to provide a philosophical sanction for attitudes and
ways of thinking that Altieri considers praiseworthy. 111e least civil formulation of the project of Subjective Agency would be to locate reasons for a good
conscience, a sense of grounding, a historico-theoretical warrant for doing
what we feel needs to be done anyway, but for other, nontheoretical reasons.
Need plays, in fact, an unusually prominent role in Altieri's discourse, which
continually refers to "the argument I need," "the contrastive ground I need,"
"the role I want this structure to play," the fact that he "need[s] a distinctive
realm of the ethical," and so on. The dust-jacket blurb begins by saying that
"For the past decade, the most pressing need in the humanities has been"for a book just like this one. In this respect, the argument itself mimes and
reinforces aspects of its own message by proceeding as though inconsistent
or incongruous elements, e.g., interiority, can be ignored if not eliminated.
This pruning impulse is virtually responSible for the "expressivist tradition" itself, all the participants in which have contrary elements to be excised
or argued around-Spinoza's religion, Kant's first rno Critiques, Hegel's
version of historicism and his emphasis on the state, parts of Wittgensteinthat make it seem on balance less a genuine philosophical consensus than a
heavily censored construct. "Since I am the one who gets to establish the criteria here," as Altieri says at one point, he can of course construct away
(148). But at a deeper level, what Altieri casts as a desirable "will to power
over one's situation" has also been applied, in his discourse, to the construc/I
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tion of a theoretical model of the subject itself (129). After a while, a reader
begins to notice that despite the formidable complexity of the prose, certain
things are missing from the Altierian subject. Chief among these is what is
commonly thought of as subjectivity itself-the feelings, thoughts, responses,
and perceptions that seem both involuntary and deeply personal, the whole
range of "inneru phenomena not easily coordinated with a "third-person"
perspective, as they are not immediately articulate as purposive, and hence
lI

as capable of bearing responsibility" (129).
More precisely, Altieri's agents lack a proper unconscious. Altieri appears
to sense some deep threat to ethical and social- projects from the various
forms of unconsciousness posited by psychoanalytic and postmodem theory.
Skewing judgments, producing disorderly symptoms, undercutting our best
interests, the unconscious interferes with the articulations, determinations
negotiations, and attributions on which Altieri stakes his project. Thus, in a
book about the subject, Freud is never mentioned, Lacan introduced only to
be dismissed, Foucault consigned to the notes, I,;yotard virtually absent, Derrida rendered ineffectual through paraphrase, Z~ek almost totally ignored
and his name consistently botched. The unconscious is not quite a world
unto itself, but Altieri seems to wish it were. "I will ignore the many ways in
l

which this model can go wrong," he says on one occasion, bracketing off all

forms of "self-delusion" and "manipulation by others" (94).
The indifference to counter-examples indicated here actually signals a
more general resistance to exemplification as such, a willingness to set aside

anything that ripples the surface of the theory. On the rare occasion when
something more specific than the general principles of agency erupt into the
discourse, the effect is bewildering: "Practices have rationales and rationales

implicate ideal exemplars who extend beyond the specific social community
into other levels of cultural traditions, a condition I find best illustrated by
the four worthies who sat on Jefferson's mantle. Moreover the demand for
reasons can lead beyond images to affiliations ..." (163). The resistance to
exemplification is most pronounced, however, when the talk turns to "social

implications," which are kept scrupulously vague through nonspecific references to lithe politics most academics espouse," or cliches about weakening
II

the authority, if not the power, of the governing elite, and hence ... fostering democratic values" (221, 8). Altieri defends this hypertheoretical generality with the cryptic pronouncement, which seems to reflect an embittered
"Berkeley" perspective, that since "few people actually like or admire those
who push the limits of free speech," only a sustained concentration on "the
formal structure of subjective investments" can ensure the integrity of the
institutions on which the functioning of liberal society depends "when the
inevitable disillusion sets in" (222).
One measure of the resilience of liberal institutions is their capacity to endure the expressions of Camille Paglia, whose Vamps and Tramps, 532 pages
of limit-pushing materials produced during the past two years, was published in October 1994. Most academics certainly neither like nor admire her;
her personal style offends, as when she boasts about being the only feminist
to boast about how many people she's punched out. But like all styles, hers
can be considered under the rubric of subjective agency. Indeed, she and Altieri have a lot in common: both are prolific Italian-American academics who
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spC<lk rapidly, advocate libertarian views, and acknowledge the friendship of
Robert C<1scrio, who must be a remarkable man. We can grasp the relation
between them most efficiently, however, by asking what subjective agency
would look like, extricated from Altieri's impacted abstractions and fiftyword sentences and set loose in the world. The answer: it might look like
Vamps alld Tramps, which both exemplifies Altieri's project and subjects it to
fierce pressures.
So a],uming and idiosyncratic is Paglia's style that many miss, or dismiss
the substance. But as these essays, interviews, transcripts, and reviews demonstrate, an argument, predicated on expressive activity particularly in the
field 01 sexuality, informs Paglia's manifold self-exhibitions. Altieri acknowledges that "accounting for the force of ... gender will be a problem for me
throughout this book," and says that he wants to get at those deep-laid aspects of subjectivity that are beneath such categories (233). For Paglia, there
is nothing beneath sexual personae except, perhaps, a bed. Humans are
sexed, and while their desires and identities can take deeply complex, indirect, ,lnd confused forms, we all fall under an obligation issuing from nature
to get on with it. Or, as she puts it "I 'would say to men: get it lip! And to
women I would say: deal with it!" (16).
\'v'hile Vamps alld Tramps is many things, there is no mistaking what it is at
any given moment. It is a description of the facts of sexual life as Paglia sees
them, a commentary on current cultural energies circulating around this subject, and, as the preceding quote demonstrates, a sermon> Paglia is perhaps
morc notorious for her style than for her substance, but this volume, containing a number of carefully considered, quietly eloquent passages and pieces
thilt arc entirely lacking in self-importance, including mature and original
considerations of Princess Diana, Bmbra Streisand, Jacqueline Onassis, and a
beautifully evocativc memoir of four gay male friends, makes a strong case
for her <1S a writer plain and simple> It would be a pity, of course, if the imprcssivc writerly virtues of some pieces were permitted to overshadow the
bullying, clamoring, narcissistic outrageousness of others>
But what is most conspicuous here is the extraordinary range of her responsi\'l~ness, which cmbr<1ccs-among a great many other subjects-Madonna, Judy Garland, Bizet's Carl11en, Monika Trcut, Sandra Bernhard, the
Alice books, Lo/ita, love poetry, the First Lady ("Kind of a Bitch: Why r Like
I-li!l<lry Clinton"), Germaine Grecr, Susan Sontag ("Sontag, Bloody Sontag"),
Edw,lrd Said, and films and books too numcrous to mention> Vamps and
Tram/'s is best read quickly, a burst of reading followed by a period of quiet
rL'flL'ction in which memorablc·im<1ges ilnd phrases swim before the mind's
eye: l\lgHa shouting down anti-pornography activists in the streets of Nel;v
York ("This is /Iullshif! Buflshif! /makes flggrcssi'(.J(' Rolling Stalles tass of the l1Iikel
Y(lll /'((ll!it- ~LlCK!" 1290]) .
P<lgHa decrying 'lthe creeping fascism of the
d,llL'-r<lpe h~>;-;terii1" llrcilL'str<lted by "St.llinist" feminists (37).
Paglia in!prming ~tLldL'nts ,It Han'<lrd, Princeton, Penn, and Johns Hopkins that their
1,1Cttlty ~Iinks
. > P,lgli,l responding briskly to "sanctimoniolls, nebbishy"
\:0,1111 Clwmsky (-l9.5) >.. Paglia prL'dicting th<lt if she .mel Sontag ever mel,
thl'~> "\\>iluld ~l.1p L"lCh other sill(' ... (357).
UnL' thing th,lt ~l'h P,lglia <lr,lrt frnm the gener<ll run of ri\><ll-slapping,
t,\(tdt~·-tr,bhing. ll'~hj'ln-h.lting iL'sbiafl l'\.pressi\>ists i~ her rl'peilted (ill! for
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academic sobriety in the form of "a return to a general education based on
hard facts and respect for scholarship" (385). It is not only the politics most
academics espouse that excites her contempt, but their scholarship as well,
precisely because the latter is too often placed at the service of the former. In
a word, she attacks the tendency of scholarship to be need-driven rather than
truth-driven, to conform to what we want rather than to what is.
Paglia earns her own stripes in this tricky area in the lead essay of the volume, "No Law in the Arena: a Pagan Theory of Sexuality," a long, six-part
exploration of the complex interplay of sex, law, criminality, deviance, and
culture. Here Paglia ventures into dark waters, arguing that: "beauty itself
may be an incitement to destroy" (34); "cock teasing is a universal reality"
(35); "sex crime is revenge against women for wounds already suffered by
men as a class" (37); IIwe career women [argue] from expedience" and not
from ethics in promoting abortion rights (39); women who decide to have
abortions are agents of "Darwinian triage" (41); laws against sexual harassment impose "a genteel white lady'S standards of decorum on everyone"
(49); "middle-class white women have got to learn to talk trash with the rest
of the human race" (51); most career women are unsuited for top managerial
jobs (54); pornography does not subordinate women and should be protected, even cherished (passim); homosexuality is not an inborn trait and IInot
'norma!,'" but a (rare) adaptation (70); homosexuality may be "a pausing at
the prepubescent stage when children anxiously band together by gender"
(78); lesbians are a dull lot (passim); and that "hot sex and healthy children
cannot be produced by eunuchs," i.e., by feminist-trained men (86).
The remarkable thing about this list of abrasions is it flatters nobody, including Paglia herself. Nobody needs these truths, if that's what they are.
What really distinguishes it from the verities most academics espouse, however, is a pair of implicit equivalencies. The first is between the Wl.acceptable

and the desirable; and the second is between the unacceptable and the true.
So various and kinetic, Paglia's thought is organized around two basic arguments: that people want what they disapprove of, and they deny what they
know. She celebrates the first and seeks to correct the second. In both respects, she sets herself up as a specialist in, and a proponent of, "the many
ways in which this model can go wrong."
Paglia's nearly absolute stylistic difference from Altieri reflects a range of
divergent positions, attitudes, orientations, and prejudices. But these differences mask deeper convergent currents, ways in which each implies the
other. She is not only the most flamboyant example of subjective agencyalbeit an example that nearly overwhelms the theory it exemplifies-but also
the "contrastive ground" Altieri really does need. He can say with justifica-

tion that while Paglia can box her comer, others who are just as far out of
the mainstream but less able to defend themselves must be able to count on
a community commitment to a weakly specified liberalism that honors "expressions" in general. For her part, Paglia needs precisely such "frigid, headtripping nerds" (a phrase she applies to Foucault [105]) as Altieri; they elicit
much of the distinctive tang of her sensibility and without them there would
be no Paglia.
One difference, however, remains. While Altieri envisions IItwo hundred

readers" (247), Paglia can safely count on, let us say, many times that num-

650

Criticism, Vol. XXXVII, No.4: Book Reviews

ber. Why should this be, when Altieri addresses our pressing need by articulating notions from which dissent is difficult, and Paglia gives us a gross
flood of ideas and impressions that remain minoritarian? Among the less
obvious reasons may be that Altieri's emphasis on conscious control and
civic responsibility makes Subjective Agency a virtuous but strangely weightless book. Having argued for a depthless subject, he can only make a shallow claim on his readers' sympathies. By contrast, Paglia's ecstatic, infuriated immersion in the superficies of life, and in those madmissible energies
that elude and deform control is both gripping as spectacle and paradoxically deep in its appeal. People may not like or admire those who push the
limits, but they do seem to want to read them.
Tulane University

Geoffrey Galt Harpham

Aesthetics and Ideology, edited by George Levine. New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1994. Pp. ix + 316. $48.00, cloth; $20.00, paper.
In an age in which iconoclasm is old hat, subversion is co-optation, and
protest itself is the slippery slope to bourgeois complacency, a truly good
book about academic and readerly trends is an exceptional feat. Cultural materialism has made cultural analysis a matter for a priori suspicion (not necessarily a bad thing, of course), and so a book such as this one, which variously scrutinizes the discourse about cultural value, is a bold venture.
Indeed, to identify a critical/theoretical zeitgeist is virtually impossible these
days: to complain about the hegemony of the critical discourse about academic hegemony is to enter a world of peculiar solipSism, one that makes
Romantic "inwardness" look dowmight accessible. But as this edition of essays makes emphatically clear, SOlne of the most notable voices in the analysis of aesthetics and ideology belong to those who feel that aesthetics as ideology is a construct that has gotten out of hand. The motivating concern of
this collection, then, is the critical study of literature as such; none of the essays rejects the implications of ideological superstructure, and none is eager
to return to some of the more benighted pieties of New Criticism. What they
share in COIlUTIon, however, is an eagerness to remember a means by which
aesthetics, and even hermeneutics, can be meaningful to human endeavor.
The book is divided into four sections, each of which interrogates anew
issues that are by now entirely familiar. The first section, Contingency and
Value, contains essays by Arnold Rampersad and Myra Jehlen, and both indulge in gestures of historical self-positioning that are recognizable as all but
de rigueur. Rampersad's essay, "Values Old and New," does not add information or chronicle a history of theory so much as it offers a straightforward
polemic about the danger signs of polemics. Beginning with an admission of
concern over the conference panel topic which initiated his discussion, he
goes on to decry the process by which (as he sees it) a new antihumanism is
quickly transforming itself into an old philistinism. This leads, he suggests,
to a wholesale rejection of values that were only ever dimly understood in
the first place, to be replaced by a set of devaluations and negative assump-
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tions that are somewhat questionable. One of Rampersad's concluding assertions may well strike some as beyond the point of the current culture wars,
but then again, his central claim is precisely that those fighting "the good
fight" too frequently miss the point: "The fact that many' dead white men'
have not only anticipated objections to hegemonic views of culture but also
proposed disruption and heterogeneity as intrinsic to genuine culture will
doubtless disappoint some. However, this is the kind of disappointment
with which we should attempt to live, the kind that should deepen our confidence in the wisdom of our basic enterprise, properly and not chauvinistically, understood" (39). In "Literary Criticism at the Edge of the Millennium;
or, From Here to History," Myra Jehlen contrasts essays she had written at
different times for different volumes. In the wake of the collapse of the Iron
Curtain, and with the acuity of corrective hindsight, she has come to conclude that the reflexivity that reveals the limits of any particular theory is
the place in which flideological criticism reveals itself lTIOre imbricated with
formalist and aestheticist approaches than was visible earlier" (52).
These are claims that proceed by way of a debunking, not of the positive
claims of ideological criticism so much as of the central focus of much ideological debunking. Put Simply, most of the authors writing here are on the
defensive about aesthetics, whatever their varying political biases. As such,
George Levine's introductory essay, "Reclaiming the Aesthetic," announces
the volume's intention by insisting upon what the aesthetic is not: "And
what I am attempting in this book and this opening chapter is movement
toward a climate of opinion that will not identify deference to the text and
admiration of it with political complicity, will not assume that the text is a
kind of enemy to be arrested, will not inevitably associate the 'literary' with
a reactionary right or dismiss the aesthetic as a strategy of mystification of
the status quo" (3). The text is not an enemy to be arrested? It seems nothing
short of startling that such contentions need be made at all. But they do, and
so Levine proceeds to a statement of purpose that tries to find a way out of
the embarrassment of a good read: "More pOSitively, I am trying to imagine
the aesthetic as a mode engaged richly and complexly with moral and political issues, but a mode that operates differently from others and contributes
in distinctive ways to the possibilities of human fulfilment and connection"
f

(3).

To this end, the second section of the volume is entitled "Rewriting the History of the Aesthetic." Containing articles by Oscar Kenshur, Mary Poovey,
Frances Ferguson and Geoffrey Galt Harpham, it seems a loosely unifiedthough still provocative-assemblage of figures from literary history uniquely
suitable to the task of decriminalizing the aesthetic. Kenshur, for example,
studies the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, and
asserts that his" absolutization of the aesthetic served not to remove it from the
hudy-burly of political strife, but rather to transform it into a powerful instrument for demystifying other ideas" (59). In "Aesthetics and Political Economy
in the Eighteenth Century: The Place of Gender in the Social Constitution of
Knowledge," Mary Poovey challenges Barbara Hernstein Smith's targeting of
"aesthetic ideology" as rationalizations in bad faith, and then looks to the example of Mary Wollstonecraft, who "was the first to recognize that one of the
devastating effects of the modern constitution of knowledge was the cultural
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denigration of women alongside (as part of) the valorization of aesthetic
beauty" (81).
These latter claims work nicely with the section about "Liberatory Aesthetics," a collection of explicit political readings by Derek Attridge ("Literary
Form and the Demands of Politics: Otherness in J. M. Coetzee's Age of Iron"),
Regenia Gagnier ("A Critique of Practical Aesthetics"), and Cheryl A. Wall
("On Freedom and the Will to Adorn: Debating Aesthetics and/ as Ideology
in African American Literature"). It is noteworthy that the claims for the
value of the aesthetic yield necessarily defensive postures, anxious assurances of ideological awareness, and often indignant protestations of fully credentialed political commitment. The emerging tendency is to answer the inhospitality toward the aesthetic with a parry and thrust: not merely ideologically inflected, the aesthetic is cruCially conscious of historical exigency, or
uniquely sensitive to populist appeals. Further-and more to the point-to
banish it from the Republic of putatively anti-bourgeois professors of literature would be to grant the forces of hegemony their final victory. Derek Attridge'S essay is paradigmatic in this regard: "Coetzee's handling of formal
properties is bound up with the capacity of his work to engage with-to
stage, confront, apprehend, explore-----otherness, and hI. this engagement it
broaches the most fundamental and widely significant issues involved in
any consideration of ethics and politics. I also believe that what happens in
Coetzee's work, and in responses to it, is only a more dramatic version of the
processes involved in all literary uses of the formal properties and potentialities of language" (244).
Attridge thus addresses an issue which is bound to be of increasing interest to critics: can formalism be something more than the enshrined Other of
political engagement? The prescribed answer here, of course is yes: yes, formalism has its place, or yes, formalism is the place in which such engagements are most persuasively performed. But this may be a means of collapsing categories, in ways that cancel the heuristic value of categorization.
Thus, the section of this volume which is potentially the most combative, is
in fact the most conciliatory. Entitled "Form, Disinterest, and Ideology," it
contains essays by Peter Brooks ("Aesthetics and Ideology-What Happened
to Poetics?"), Maria Dibattista (,"Sabbath Eyes': Ideology and the Writer's
Gaze"), Susan J. Wolfson ('''Romantic Ideology' and the Values of Aesthetic
Form"), and William Keach (" 'Words Are Things': Romantic Ideology and
the Matter of Poetic Language"). For Susan Wolfson, as for the others writing in this collection, the value of close reading has lately been underestimated. Thus, to escape the charge of ideological co-optation, we should
show how poetic form" can be involved in processes of ideological critiquehow, in fact, attention to aesthetic formation in its particularities, densities,
and complexities can be generated out of the very criticism that has emerged
in antithesis to it" (190). Similarly William Keach would remind us that formalism is no enemy of the revolution: "The current task, as I see it, is to understand how critically to rethink and affirm the materiality of formal articulation in art and literature-not just in an imagined socialist future, but in
cultural situations that remorselessly reify, commodify, fetishize such articulation. This is a version, of course, of what the Romantics themselves had to
do, in economic and social circumstances that crucially anticipate our own"
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(221).
These represent important assertions, for they are insightful, observant,

and emphatically need to be made. The latter day dismissal of aesthetics and
aesthetic form in the name of political maturity has been an unfortunte phenomenon, and the facts of the case need, certainly, to be re-stated as often as
possible. But we also need to think hard about the implications of defending
the critique of so-called aesthetic ideology by insisting that aesthetics was
always primarily in the service of critique. This is not to say at all that such
arguments are mere grasps at straws, only that we are in danger of misunderstanding, or at least of under-valuing, our own commitments to the text.
Neither am I claiming that the contributors to this volume have gravely
oversimplified the terms of their respective arguments. But we must exercise
a special vigilance in this case; to defend the aesthetic on the grounds that it
was always seif-conscious ideology is to offer it up for cannibalization.
Alas, it is consumption indeed which we begin and end with-consuming
texts, it is only natural that we wonder about our impulses to spit them out.
But the aesthetic is always reconstituting itseif, and if we have developed a
different stomach for it, as it were, then we will have to learn a healthy way
of digesting it. This volume is a welcome aid to such an endeavor.
University of Toronto

Karen A. Weisman

High Concept: Movies and Marketing in Hollywood, by Justin Wyatt. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1994. Pp. x + 237. $35.00, cloth; $17.95, paper.

Having been a marketing analyst in Hollywood before becoming an academic professional, Justin Wyatt is especially qualified to examine the rise
and dominance of high concept filmmaking in Hollywood since the mid1970s. In High Concept, Wyatt takes his cue from the work of David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson (The Classical Hollywood Cinema:
Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 [New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985]), who he says "develop classical Hollywood cinema as a particular stylistic system with clear economic and aesthetic determinants" (16).
Wyatt praises Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson's seminal work, while managing to point out that significant economic and institutional changes have
occurred in Hollywood since 1960, making it necessary to examine how recently "the conglomeration of the film industry and the rise of television,
new marketing methods, and changing distribution strategies-have extended and modified some significant traits of the classical model" (16).
Wyatt's first task is to define, or as he says "redefine," high concept. He
cites two apocryphal Hollywood stories about tl,e origin and use of the term.
TI,e first gives Barry Dmer, programming director at ABC in the early 1970s,
credit for coming up with and exploiting high concept. According to Wyatt,
"[slince Dmer needed stories which could be easily summarized for a thirtysecond television spot, he approved those projects which could be sold in a
single sentence" (8). Diller's ideas for high concept TV movies produced hits
like Briml's Song (1971) and That Certain Slimmer (1972), "whose themes and
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appeal were immediately obvious" (8). Indeed, Diller's model is still in place
for TV movies today, as the recent trio of Amy Fisher movies, one for each
network, would suggest. The other potential source of the high concept approach could be Disney's Michael Eisner; "[a]ccording to [Jeffrey] Katzenberg, Eisner used high concept while working as a creative executive at
Paramount to describe a unique idea whose originality could be conveyed
briefly" (8). Regardless of who came up with the idea, the basic premise
of high concept filmmaking is the same. As Wyatt suggests, "one can think
of high concept as comprising 'the look, the hook, and the book.' The look of
the images, the marketing hooks, and the reduced narratives form the cornerstones of high concept" (22).
Having redefined high concept as "the look, the hook, and the book,"
Wyatt feels the need to defend his project from would be detractors. He
states, "[t]he attempt to construct this model of high concept should not be
viewed as an academic spin on the critics' condemnation of commercial filmmaking, nor as an attempt to glorify the popular. Rather the project addresses the initially curious supposition that Grease, along with Jaws (1975),
Stnr Wars (1977), and Saturday Night Fever, is of greater Significance to American film history than the critically and institutionally recognized films of the
period ... " (22). The question Wyatt is anticipating here is whether or not
popular films should be given as much critical attention as the more "serious" films of the last twenty years. The obvious answer here, as demonstrated by the recent boom of cultural and American studies programs in
academia, is absolutely. In fact, looking at the "popular" has increasingly become the norm in academic film studies as a recent course on the films of
Keanu Reeves at Cal Arts indicates. In this light, it is a bit odd that Wyatt
warns "canon builders" not to leave off popular films as "through understanding the commercial recipe and economic determinants of a film like
Grease, one can gain a true appreciation of the contemporary landscape of
American film-a landscape which has nurtured and privileged the high
concept film" (22). It is only after digging into High Concept that this curious
defense of an approach to film which considers the economic realities of the
industry, at a time when such approaches are conunonplace, begins to make
sense. For Wyatt is not attempting to include a discussion of the economic
determinants in one or tvvo films, but rather wants to show how pervasive
the high concept model is in shaping most of the current Hollywood commercial product. Consequently, his book focuses, perhaps too narrowly for
current academic tastes, on the economic aspects of high concept to the exclusion of other concerns.
That said, Wyatt's thorough analysis of the extent to which economic factors determine the "image and high concept style" of contemporary Hollywood cinema might be said to justify his exclusive focus on those factors. He
sets up as his primary model the distinction between the high concept film
Grease (1978), and the "low concept" All That Jazz (1979). According to Wyatt,
Grease can be considered high concept for a variety of reasons. He cites the
film's use of the stars John Travolta and Olivia Nevvton-John to attract a
young audience, as well as fla host of media stars evoking the film's period
of the 50's," to attract older audiences seeking the film's nostalgia. (4) He
goes on to discllss the addition to the original Broadway score of two songs,
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"You're the One That I Want" and "Hopelessly Devoted to You," which became hits in part for their '''contemporary' 70's sound." He further discusses
the marketing of the film paying particular attention to the film's logo "a
small car containing the word 'Grease' written in a fluid, grease-like style"
(4). In short, he argues that every facet of the film, from pre-production
through release, can, and should, be analyzed in economic terms. In contrast,
All That Jazz, while critically praised, lacks all of the high concept qualities
that made Grease such a hit, and financial success. It is therefore an example
of the "low concept" filmmaking in which Hollywood is less and less involved.
While Wyatt's interpretation of Grease, and the hundreds of other films he
examines, is not close reading in the classic style, it is a careful analysis of
the economic determinants of the film. Wyatt's willingness to dig deeply
into the marketing campaigns of various high concept films (he provides
numerous lists and charts of movies that fit the bill) is perhaps the most revealing part of his book. He also shows how some films fall in their efforts to
conform to the high concept model-notably a discussion of the poster campaign for The Hunger (1983) with Catherine Deneuve and David Bowie. He
explains how high concept leads to more high concept as studios prefer to
take fewer risks, and he discusses the effects of studio conglomeration, once
again offering revealing charts and tables in support. In the end, his book is,
as promised, a detailed look at the inner workings of the Hollywood economic system and how that system has shaped the type and look of mainstream films since the 1970s.
Wyatt's book is one of those studies that is bound to enforce a new way of
considering contemporary Hollywood cinema. He presents a new way to examine high concept film in greater detail instead of dismissing it as just another crassly commercial product. As is the case with most methods of analyzing film, looking at films in terms of their conformity to high concept
rules will prove most useful when combining the economic analysis with a
variety of other approaches. His book is a bit high concept itself, though per- haps not to its detriment. It is full of charts, graphs, pictures and tables and
somewhat mirrors the concern for style and "look and hook" that current
Hollywood cinema displays, and may reflect a current trend in academia for
more enticing publishing methods; however, its slickness should not detract
from its potential usefulness in current film studies.
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